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CURRENT ATTITUDES
OF THE COURTS
TOWARD CHURCH
PROPERTIES AND
LIABILITIES
CHARLES M. WHELAN, S.J.
There are three cases that I wish to discuss with you this morning:
Jones v. Wolf,' a church property dispute decided by the Supreme Court;
Barr v. United Methodist Church,2 a church liability case currently in
progress in the California courts; and finally, Worldwide Church of God,
Inc. v. California,3 a church accountability case that is also before the
California courts and is now pending on a petition for a writ of certiorari
to the United States Supreme Court.
All of these cases are of great importance for the future of church-
state relations in the United States. Indeed, it is sage to predict that dur-
ing the 1980's, the spotlight in the litigational arena of church-state rela-
tions will shift from the aid-to-education cases to the church property,
liability, and accountability cases.
The shift will be gradual because of some very important questions
that must be settled concerning various forms of public assistance to edu-
cation and church-related institutions. The shift is inevitable because of
the magnitude of the questions that the litigants have raised concerning
church property, church liability, and church accountability. The lower
courts and the bar justifiably will press the Supreme Court for guidance
in these very sensitive areas.
Everyone is quite familiar with the rather long line of decisions that
the Supreme Court has handed down in the area of church property dis-
putes over the past 110 years. Watson v. Jones,4 an 1871 case, is of course
443 U.S. 595 (1979).
90 Cal. App. 3d 259, 153 Cal. Rptr. 322 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 973 (1979).
* 623 F.2d 613 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3617 (1981).
* 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
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the seminal case and Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich,5
decided in 1976, was the last word until Jones v. Wolf' came down last
July.
The Serbian case ringingly reaffirmed the Watson principle that the
decisions of ecclesiastical bodies are binding on the civil courts in church
property disputes. Jones does not directly attack that principle, but Jus-
tice Powell states that the Court's opinion superimposes "a new structure
of rules that will make the decision of these [church property] cases by
civil courts more difficult."'7 The new analysis, he also says, is more likely
to invite intrusions into church policy which are forbidden by the first
amendment.
Justice Powell was writing in dissent, and I tell my constitutional law
students at Fordham that dissenting and concurring opinions prove only
what the law is not. I also tell my students that sometimes one cannot
really understand an opinion of the Supreme Court without carefully
reading the dissenting and concurring opinions.
The Court's majority opinion in Jones is such a case. The vote was 5
to 4, with Justice Blackmun writing the majority opinion. There was one
dissent and no concurring opinion, but the dissent was signed by an un-
usual coalition of Justices-Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart,
White, and Powell. It is very unusual to find the Chief Justice parting
company with Mr. Justice Blackmun. It is even more unusual to find Jus-
tices Stewart and White together on the losing side of a 5-to-4 vote. In
almost all 5-to-4 decisions of the past twenty years, Justice Stewart was
on one side of the vote and Justice White was on the other. That is why
they consistently have been identified as the "swing men" on the Su-
preme Court.
Since Justice Powell joined the Court, he has also moved into a swing
position. You remember his key votes in cases like Branzbur v. Hayess
and Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.' Justice Powell's
dissent in Jones is very important because all three swing justices signed
it. It is also important because the Chief Justice signed it. Whatever else
you may think about the Chief Justice after reading Woodward and Arm-
strong's sophomoric indictment in The Brethren, you should remember
that the Chief Justice generally has voted on our side in the church-state
cases. If, as I very much doubt, Justice Stevens were ten times the lawyer
that the Chief Justice is, I still would rather see another Burger than
another Stevens on the Court.
" 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
6 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
7 Id. at 610 (Powell, J., dissenting).
8 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
- 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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Indeed, in the five man majority in Jones, there is only one justice
whom we may have any reason to regard with benevolence-Justice
Rehnquist. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens consistently have
voted against us in the aid-to-education cases, and Justice Blackmun has
voted against us far more often than not. Therefore, approach the major-
ity opinion in Jones with a certain amount of trepidation.
At the very beginning of his opinion for the Court, Justice Blackmun
states the issue in the case: "[the question for decision is whether civil
courts, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Con-
stitution, may resolve [church property disputes] on the basis of 'neutral
principles of law,' or whether [the civil courts] must defer to the resolu-
tion of an authoritative tribunal of the hierarchical church."'10 This state-
ment of the issue accurately reflects the division between the five man
majority and the four man minority. The issue in this case is not who is
entitled to the possession and enjoyment of the church property-the 164
members of the Vineville Presbyterian Church in Georgia who, together
with their pastor, voted to separate from the Presbyterian Church in the
United States and join the Presbyterian Church in America or, the 94
members of the Vineville Church who voted against the division from the
mother church.
The Georgia courts, indeed, awarded the possession and enjoyment
of the property to the 164 schismatics. By the time one finishes reading
Justice Blackmun's opinion, it is clear that the five man majority has
given the 94 true believers another chance to regain possession and enjoy-
ment of the church property. Under the majority's mandate, the case
went back to the Georgia courts for a determination of what it called
"critical issues of state law." The majority explicitly disclaimed any view
about the ultimate outcome of the controversy.
The fight then, in Jones, concerns the principles of law that state
courts may apply in the adjudication of church property disputes. The
dissenters would require the state to defer to the authoritative resolution
of the dispute within the church itself. The majority would permit the
states to defer, but they would also permit the states to adopt and apply
"neutral principles of property law," neutral in the sense that the princi-
ples exclude any consideration by the civil courts of the doctrine, disci-
pline, or ritual of the divided church.
Specifically, the majority opinion permits the states to adopt two so-
called neutral principles. The first, the Court identifies as the trust prin-
ciple and the second, the majoritarian principle.
The trust principle says that in deciding whether the property of the
local church is under the control of the mother church, the state courts
" 443 U.S. at 597.
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may disregard all of the religious language in the constitution of the local
church and in the constitution of the mother church, and may look in-
stead for civil law terminology that either creates or does not create a
trust. Under this trust principle, the states are free to hold that unless
there is sufficient civil law language to create a trust in favor of the
mother church, local church property does not belong to, nor is under the
supervision and control of, the mother church.
The second neutral principle that the states may adopt is a presump-
tion that the government of the local church acts by majority rule. Again,
this presumption may be overcome by sufficient civil law language. If the
charter of the local church or the constitution of the mother church ex-
plicitly rejects the majoritarian principle, and does so quite clearly in lan-
guage that any civil lawyer would understand, one can overcome the
majoritarian principle. In the absence of such "plain English," however,
the courts may hold that the vote of the majority of the church's mem-
bers accurately reflects its government.
The combination of these neutral principles is justified by Justice
Blackmun as removing from the court's considerations of religious doc-
trine, discipline, and ritual. He says in one place that the Court already
has suggested in prior cases that churches should make it easier for the
courts to understand where the seat of a church's authority is and how
that authority is to be exercised. Justice Blackmun's opinion reflects a
certain irritation with the mysteries of religious language.
What the Jones majority has done is to issue an invitation to the
states to enact laws forcing church attorneys to write documents in a way
that will be comprehended easily by the civil courts in the event that
there is a schism within the local church. The majority, however, does not
say that the states have to do this-it says the states may do this if they
choose to do so.
Justice Powell's dissent opposes the majority rather vigorously. He
stated that the majority disclaims any view concerning the final outcome
of this case. He also stated that it is disingenuous, because under the line
of cases from Watson to Milivojevich, no doubt exists that it is the 94
members who are entitled to the possession and enjoyment of this prop-
erty. The schismatics, however, had been given possession and enjoyment
by the Georgia court. What is really going to happen, Justice Powell
stated, is that the 94 true believers are not going to get possession and
enjoyment of the church. Justice Powell's dissent sharply criticizes the
majority for not awarding immediate possession and enjoyment to the 94
true believers.
These 94 people were identified as true believers by the proper au-
thorities of the Presbyterian Church in the United States. That church
had exercised its power and authority through its proper tribunals to de-
cide which of these two groups was the loyal group. It was not a difficult
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decision-the schismatics had voted to secede from the Presbyterian de-
nomination, the Presbyterian Church in America.
The second point that Justice Powell makes is that the majority's
opinion is likely to cause considerable consternation among church attor-
neys. Many of them feel that they should redraft the basic documents of
the mother and the local church in order to leave no possibility of doubt
about where the locus of authority is and how it is to be exercised. Justice
Powell suggested that this is not a desirable result.
He argued that the majority's position really cannot be justified by
saying that these neutral principles will save courts from entanglement
with religious doctrine, discipline, and ritual. That justification misreads
the purpose of the first amendment. That purpose, Justice Powell states,
is not to ease the burden of the judges, but to protect the liberty of the
churches' exercise of religion.
Justice Powell concludes by arguing that these new evidentiary rules
will result in substantial interference with denominations. He points to
what he considers the certain result on remand to the Georgia court in
this case. The bottom line, he says, is that the schismatics will get the
property-that result violates the first amendment.
The second case that I want to discuss is Barr v. United Methodist
Church." Most of the information I have comes from one of the Method-
ists involved in the case. The factual background of Barr is rather compli-
cated. The essence is that some Methodist corporations developed hous-
ing projects in various parts of the Southwest. Because some of the
planning was not sufficiently farsighted, some very serious difficulties
arose. Some people who had purchased homes in these developments
were very dissatisfied. They sued not only the corporations that were di-
rectly and obviously involved in this development, but also the United
Methodist Church (UMC).
The original response by the UMC was, in effect: "[w]e don't exist.
We should be dismissed as a defendant because we do not exist. The term
'United Methodist Church' is pure nominalism; there really isn't any such
thing in civil law." When the judge appeared before the lawyers he said:
"[tihat's rather strange, because I remember that last year or the year
before, there was a bequest to the UMC, and somebody showed up to
collect it." Initially, the judge denied the motion.
The lawyers became a little more sophisticated after that. They took
the position that UMC exists, but it cannot be sued. They lost on that
point in the California courts. The case is presently in a very complicated
procedural position. The UMC lawyers applied to the United States Su-
preme Court for an immediate stay of the California judge's order. Justice
" 90 Cal. App. 3d 259, 153 Cal. Rptr. 322 cert. denied, 444 U.S. 973 (1979).
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Rehnquist denied that stay because, in his view, the special rules concern-
ing church property disputes apply only when there is a dispute within
the church. If a creditor is suing the church, or if someone alleges a tort
or a contract claim against a church, the first amendment does not offer
any special protection.
According to the information I received from Kent Weeks, the UMC
is very seriously disturbed about being a defendant in a case where the
plaintiffs are seeking damages in the hundreds of millions of dollars. The
fear is that when the liability issue is resolved against the UMC, the
plaintiffs, in an attempt to collect on the judgment, will try to proceed
through the subsidiary organizations to what they consider is the parent,
and then through the parent into other subsidiaries not directly involved.
I am no expert on creditor's rights, but my own opinion is that this
fear of the bridge is unrealistic. Of course, one may have to spend a great
deal of money litigating to prove no such bridge exists. It can be a very
expensive and anxious victory. Nevertheless, I do not see any reason to
believe that the courts would permit a plaintiff to go from a parish, to a
diocese, to a province and then, to another province and then, to another
diocese or parish. It seems very unlikely that the assets of the Archdio-
cese of San Francisco could be used to pay off the judgment resulting
from a parochial school fire in New York.
In any event, after I have finished the main part of my talk, I hope
that any of you who have any experience with similar suits will tell us
about them. We definitely need to collect all the information we can get.
Last year I was referred to the Jesuit high school in Houston which
went into bankruptcy. The court appointed a trustee, who sued not only
the directors of the high school, but also the New Orleans Province of the
Society of Jesus for mismanagement. Again, a motion was made to have
the Society of Jesus dismissed as a defendant in the case. That motion
was denied. The case was finally settled by agreement among the par-
ties-the Society no longer stood as a defendant in that case.
One of the problems that I thought was quite clear in that situation
was who had the authority to represent the Society. It seemed to me that
Father Arrupe should have made a decision about that. The possibility of
conflict between the interests of the local unit and the parent body of the
religious order was very real.
My concluding remark about this whole situation is that I do not see
any legal desirability in contending that we do not exist. Our capacity to
be sued as a church obviously is going to depend upon the procedural law
of the state in which the suit is brought. This is an area where I am quite
sure that we will have some interesting cases and we should be well pre-
pared. Above all, as we have tried to do all along, we should share our
information with each other promptly, so that we can be of the greatest
possible assistance to each other.
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The Worldwide Church of God case in California is a real nightmare.
The factual background and the procedural history of that case almost
defy imagination. The facts state that some dissatisfied members of the
Worldwide Church of God, including Garner Ted Armstrong (the son of
the founder of the church, Herbert Armstrong), went to the attorney gen-
eral of California. After speaking with him, the attorney general went into
the state courts and got a receiver appointed in an ex parte proceeding.
The receiver then fired Herbert Armstrong as the head of the church.
That is just the beginning of the nightmare.
The receiver subsequently was ousted because the members of the
church rallied around Herbert Armstrong. Out of their own personal
funds (many of them had to mortgage their homes to get this money),
they put up the $3 million bond that the judge had insisted upon as a
condition of removing the receiver from power. The story goes on and on,
and gets more complicated.
The church leaders, of course, were absolutely appalled at suddenly
being deprived of control of the church finances and employees. They also
were appalled that the receiver moved into the church headquarters.
They held a conference to figure out how to get the receiver out of the
building legally. There was a rule in the church against smoking and the
receiver was a chain smoker. So, the church leaders went back to the
judge who had appointed the receiver and said, "he's smoking in our
building." The judge told the receiver he could not smoke in that build-
ing. The receiver then left. That is how the leaders got their headquarters
back.
The Worldwide Church of God has already been up to the Supreme
Court on a petition for certiorari once before. The Court turned that one
down-it simply went up to the Court too fast. The Church is back in the
Supreme Court at the present time. No action has been taken on their
petition. This time they have retained Professor Lawrence Tribe of
Harvard Law School to represent them in the Supreme Court. Most of
you, I am sure, at least have seen Tribe's one volume treatise on Ameri-
can constitutional law.
The contentions that Tribe makes and the reasons he advances for
the Court to grant the writ, are as follows:
I. The Discovery Orders Upheld Below Conflict Squarely With the Security
of Personal Papers and Effects From Unreasonable Search and Seizure;
With Associational Privacy; With the Free Exercise of Religion; and With
the Separation of Church and State.
A. The Challenged Examinations and Review of Church Records by
Civil Authorities Constitutes Forbidden Entanglement.
B. The Public and Coercive Character of This Investigation Infringes
upon Petitioners' First Amendment Rights of Association and Reli-
gious Privacy.
C. The Orders Upheld Below Lack the Factual Basis and Narrow
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Scope Required by the First and Fourth Amendments.
II. The Claims of State Authority Underlying These Discovery Orders, and
the State's Conduct of the Lawsuit in Which the Orders Were Entered, Are
Starkly Incompatible With Rights of Private Property and Religious
Autonomy.
A. The State's Claimed Source of Authority is Unconstitutional.
B. The State's Avowed Purposes in Exercising This Authority Are
Unconstitutional.
1. The Judgments Below Aim Impermissibly at Supervising Spend-
ing Choices by Church Officials.
2. The Judgments Below Aim Impermissibly at Superimposing Ex-
ternal Standards on Internal Church Relationships.
3. The Judgments Below Aim Impermissibly at Altering Church
Policy and Leadership.
C. The State's Conduct of the Underlying Lawsuit Taints the Judg-
ments Below.
III. The Trial Court's Punitive and Coercive Treatment of Each Defendant
Who Challenges the Validity of the State's Discovery in any Appellate
Court Violates Due Process and Federal Supremacy.
IV. The Presence of Overlapping Discovery Orders Directed to Numerous
Individuals in Addition to the Church Creates an Unacceptably High Risk
That Denying Judicial Review Now Would Permit only Judicial Autopsy
Later.
This case is of interest to us for two reasons. If the Supreme Court
grants certiorari, the United States Catholic Conference obviously will
have a tremendous interest in the outcome. I hope the USCC will file a
brief amicus. If the Court takes jurisdiction, certainly we cannot sit back
and leave it to others to outline some kind of acceptable and constitu-
tional procedure for the Supreme Court to adopt.
The problem in this kind of case is very serious. We all know that
there are a number of fly-by-night religious organizations in this country.
The Worldwide Church of God is not such an organization. Whatever you
think of Herbert Armstrong, it is a church that has been around for many
years. It is not older than he is, but he is in his eighties and he began as a
young man. It has several hundred thousand members all over the world
and the members have demonstrated their commitment and sincerity by
tithing to this church. This is an honest-to-goodness church.
Why the attorney general of California decided to target in on this
particular church is hard for me to understand. There are fly-by-night
churches and there are churches set up merely to avoid taxes. Moreover,
the state certainly has to have some kind of procedural mechanism for
investigating charges of embezzlement of church funds or of misappropri-
ation or misuse of church funds.
It is going to be the task of lawyers in this case to suggest procedures
to the Court that would safeguard the legitimate interests of the public
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and the state. The construction of such procedures is bound to involve
some very difficult choices. If we leave it to the Supreme Court to con-
struct these standards, we almost certainly will receive a less desirable
answer than we would if we tried to formulate our own and then persuade
the Court that it is correct.
Another reason the case is of interest to us is that, ever since this
case began, the Worldwide Church of God has been engaged in a very
aggressive campaign to rally the support of all the major churches in the
United States. Particularly, in both appearances before the Supreme
Court, the Worldwide Church of God was most anxious to get the major
church denominations to file briefs amici in support of their petition for
certiorari.
I have been in very close contact with the attorneys in the case, and I
told them that I simply do not believe in lobbying the Supreme Court at
the level of petition for certiorari. If the Court grants the petition, and if
it is a case of major significance to us, then it is not only appropriate, but
it is necessary that we be involved. The number of church-state cases be-
ing docketed in the Supreme Court calendar, however, gets larger and
larger each year. The Office of General Counsel of the United States
Catholic Conference has more than enough to do without reviewing every
one of those to see whether a brief amicus should be filed at the petition
of certiorari stage.
I recognize that there are many responsible religious leaders, attor-
neys, and organizations that disagree with my feeling and judgment on
this matter. Actually, the Worldwide Church of God succeeded in getting
an impressive list of church bodies to file a brief amicus in support of
their petition for certiorari. Both the National Council of Churches of
Christ in the United States of America and the Synagogue Council of
America are on the brief. The Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs,
the Lutheran Church in America, the Association of Evangelical Lutheran
Churches, the United Methodist Church, William Thompson (Stated
Clerk of the General Assembly of the United Presbyterian Church in the
United States), and many other religious organizations signed other ami-
cus briefs. The United States Catholic Conference is conspicuous in its
absence from these groups. Nevertheless, I think we made the right
choice-not to get involved in lobbying the Court to grant a particular
petition for a writ of certiorari.
. In the time that remains, I would like to hear not only any questions
you may have, but I would particularly like to hear some reports about
cases that you are involved with or that you know about in these areas of
church property disputes, church liability or church accountability. We
need to compile a really good file in these areas now and to stay on top of
developments.
